Two months into a war with the U.S. and Israel, Iran no longer has a single, undisputed clerical arbiter at the pinnacle of power — an abrupt break with the past that may be hardening Tehran’s stance as it weighs renewed talks with Washington.
Since its creation in 1979, the Islamic Republic has revolved around a supreme leader with final authority on all key matters of state. But the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the first day of the war, and the elevation of his wounded son, Mojtaba, have ushered in a different order dominated by commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and marked by the absence of a decisive, authoritative referee.
Mojtaba Khamenei remains at the apex of the system, but three people familiar with internal deliberations say his role is largely to legitimize decisions made by his generals rather than issue directives himself.
Wartime pressure has concentrated power into a narrower, harder-line inner circle rooted in the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the Supreme Leader’s office and the IRGC, which now dominates both military strategy and key political decisions, Iranian officials and analysts say.
“The Iranians are painfully slow in their response,” said a senior Pakistani government official briefed on peace talks between Iran and the United States that Islamabad has been mediating. “There is apparently no one decision-making command structure. At times, it takes them 2 to 3 days to respond.”
Analysts said the obstacle to a deal is not internal infighting in Tehran, but the gap between what Washington is prepared to offer and what Iran’s hardline Guards were willing to accept.
The diplomatic face of Iran at the talks with the U.S. has been Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, more recently joined by parliament speaker Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf — a former Guards commander, Tehran mayor and presidential candidate — who has emerged during the war as a key conduit between Iran’s political, security and clerical elites.
On the ground, however, the central interlocutor has been IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi, according to a Pakistani and two Iranian sources who identified him weeks ago as Iran’s pivotal figure, including on the night a ceasefire was announced.
Mojtaba, who was severely injured in the opening Israeli and U.S. strike that killed his father and other relatives and left him disfigured with serious leg wounds, has not appeared publicly and communicates through IRGC aides or limited audio links because of security constraints, two people close to his inner circle said.
There was no immediate reply from the Iranian foreign ministry to a request for comment on the issues raised in this article. Iranian officials have previously denied any divisions over negotiations with the United States.
REAL POWER WIELDED BY WARTIME LEADERSHIP, INSIDERS SAY
Iran submitted a new proposal to Washington on Monday, which according to senior Iranian sources envisions staged talks, with the nuclear issue to be set aside at the start until the war ends and disputes over Gulf shipping are resolved. Washington insists the nuclear issue must be addressed from the outset.
“Neither side wants to negotiate,” said Alan Eyre, an Iran expert and former U.S. diplomat, adding that both believed time would weaken the other — Iran through leverage over Hormuz and Washington through economic pressure and a blockade.
For now, neither side can afford to bend, Eyre said: Iran’s IRGC is wary of appearing weak to Washington, while President Donald Trump faces midterm election pressure and little room for flexibility without political cost.
“For either, flexibility would be seen as weakness,” Eyre said.
That caution reflects not just the pressures of the moment, but the way power is now exercised inside Iran.While Mojtaba is formally Iran’s ultimate authority, he is a figure of assent rather than command, insiders say, endorsing outcomes forged through institutional consensus, rather than imposing authority. Real power, they say, has moved to a unified wartime leadership centered on the SNSC.
“Important deals probably pass through him,” Iranian analyst Arash Azizi said, “but I can’t see him overruling the National Security Council. How could he go against those running the war effort?”
Hardline figures such as former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and a cluster of radical MPs have raised their profile using forceful rhetoric during the war, but they lack the institutional clout to derail decisions or shape outcomes.
Mojtaba owes his elevation to the Guards, who sidelined pragmatists and backed him as a reliable guardian of their hardline agenda. Already strengthened by war, the Guards’ growing dominance signals a more aggressive foreign policy and tighter domestic repression, sources familiar with the country’s inner policy-making circles told Reuters.
Driven by revolutionary Islamism and a security‑first worldview, the Guards see their mission as preserving the Islamic Republic at home while projecting deterrence abroad.
That outlook, often shared with hardliners across the judiciary and the clerical establishment, prioritises rigid centralised control and resistance to Western pressure, particularly on nuclear policy and Iran’s regional reach.
