Ten years after the 2016 Uri terror attack, we revisit how then-Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar gave the go-ahead for a cross-LoC operation hours after four Pakistani terrorists killed 18 Indian Army soldiers at a military camp in Srinagar. Parikar’s green signal set in motion the planning and execution of the surgical strikes that followed days later.
“Why now, why today?” asked Lieutenant General Satish Dua as he was told that then Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar would be visiting the military camp at Uri. It was September 18, 2016, and just hours earlier, 18 soldiers had been killed in a terror attack carried out by Pakistani terrorists. A fire was still burning at the site. Dua, then the Indian Army’s 15 Corps commander, was overseeing the sanitisation operations even as bodies of soldiers were being moved and the wounded evacuated. Dua said he “didn’t need more VIPs that day”, but little did he know that Parrikar would give him the go ahead for something unusual — a cross-Line of Control (LoC) surgical strike.
Parikar’s visit to Uri would set in motion one of the Indian Army’s most consequential military operations of the decade.
Ten years have passed since the Indian Army crossed the LoC and carried out “surgical strikes”, targeting terrorist camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) and inflicting heavy casualties, according to the Army’s account. The operation on the night of September 28-29, 2016, was India’s response to the Uri attack and marked a significant moment in the country’s approach to cross-border terrorism.
THE DAY THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING
The Uri attack on September 18, 2016, came just before dawn. Four terrorists had entered the Army’s base near the LoC, exploiting a period when a battalion (consisting 800-1,000 soldiers) was being replaced by another. The changeover meant that soldiers from both units were present at the base, increasing the concentration of troops.
The terrorists breached the perimeter and opened fire. One was killed soon after entering, but the others dispersed and started shooting at soldiers who were still asleep or waking up. Then came another disaster. An LPG cylinder exploded in the cookhouse, setting it ablaze and spreading the flames to nearby tents.
Dua, who was responsible for military operations in Kashmir, was woken by a call from the GOC of Baramulla Division. Within about half an hour, he had a clearer picture of the scale of the attack. Eighteen soldiers were dead.
He has described it as the darkest day of his military career.
By the time Parrikar was due to arrive, the gunfire had stopped, but the fires were still burning, Lt Gen Dua (Retd) wrote in his book, India’s Bravehearts.
Bodies and wounded soldiers had been moved to the field hospital. Security forces were searching the surrounding forest for any remaining terrorists. Every few minutes, the heat caused ammunition or grenades to explode, Dua also wrote in his book.
That day, Dua had calls to answer from Army Headquarters, the police and civil administration. Then Army chief, General Dalbir Singh Suhag, was already in Srinagar. The mortal remains of the soldiers had to be transported home, while a homage ceremony had to be organised.
But Parrikar’s arrival changed the trajectory of the day. Dua had initially refused the minister’s wish to travel to Uri because the operation was still underway and the area was unsafe. Parrikar accepted the decision without protest. Both then met at Srinagar Airport, from where they went to the Badami Bagh Cantonment (BB Cantt) in Srinagar.
It was during that short flight in a Mi-17 helicopter that Dua began thinking beyond the immediate crisis. India had endured repeated attacks launched by terrorists who crossed the LoC. The conventional response had largely been defensive. But the mood after Uri was different. There was public anger, soldiers wanted retaliation and the political leadership, Dua believed, was prepared to consider a more forceful response.
A year after the Uri attacks, then-Home Minister Rajnath Singh revealed that then-Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar was “extremely upset and angry” after the attacks.
CROSS-LoC STRIKE WAS BEING DISCUSSED
Days after the Uri attack, the possibility of a cross-LoC strike was already being discussed. An India Today Magazine report from 2016 noted that the Indian Army had several calibrated retaliatory options along the LoC, including cross-border raids. It also reported that one option under consideration was a covert raid on Forward Defended Localities in Pakistan that housed terrorists involved in cross-border infiltration.
The report also quoted retired Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) as saying that India’s response to what he described as “hybrid warfare” should combine diplomatic and military measures, while retired Air Vice-Marshal Kapil Kak said any military action needed clearly defined political and strategic objectives.
The report provides a snapshot of the military options being discussed in the immediate aftermath of Uri.
PARRIKAR’S GO-AHEAD TO THE INDIAN ARMY
At Srinagar’s Badami Bagh Cantonment, Dua briefed Parrikar, Army chief General Dalbir Singh Suhag (Retd), and Northern Army Commander Lieutenant General DS Hooda (Retd) on the situation. When the briefing ended, Parrikar asked what the plan was.
Dua told him he wanted to discuss that separately.
Inside Dua’s chamber, the Army’s senior commanders first discussed the larger strategic considerations and the possibility that military action could escalate into a wider confrontation. Then Parrikar turned to Dua and asked what he had in his mind.
Dua’s answer was, “Aap haan keh do, main kar doonga, sir.”
The proposal was to cross the LoC and hit terrorist camps. The choice of targets and the timing, Dua told the minister, would have to remain with the Army.
In his book, India’s Bravehearts, Dua wrote that Parrikar had two immediate concerns. One was civilian casualties. Dua assured him that the proposed targets were in uninhabited areas and that the operation would be planned to minimise such risks.
The second concern was the safety of Indian soldiers. Dua told him that the Army expected to avoid casualties but could not guarantee it. “This is war,” Dua said.
Parrikar paused before responding in Marathi, “Barobar!”
Dua wrote in his book, “This Marathi word has different meanings in different contexts. Here, to me, it sounded like ‘Great! Let’s do it.'”
Parrikar was later lauded for the decisions he took during his tenure as the defence minister. His role in approving the operation was also highlighted by Dua in his account.
THE NEXT STAGE WAS PREPARATION FOR CROSS-LoC ATTACKS
For around 10 days, Army commanders and Special Forces teams worked through multiple possibilities. Target selection, routes, timing, contingencies and the risks of detection were examined repeatedly. Mock-ups of the target areas were used for rehearsals.
Even seemingly minor details mattered.
At one point, there was a debate over which route a team should take. Dua favoured the longer route because the shorter one passed closer to a village. His concern was that barking dogs could expose the soldiers. He recalled an earlier operation in which dogs had alerted people to the presence of troops from a considerable distance.
The secrecy of the operations was such that Dua prohibited Micorsoft PowerPoint presentations. Maps and diagrams were to be drawn by hand and destroyed afterwards. Information was distributed strictly on a need-to-know basis.
Even the operation itself was not given a formal code name.
The Army also used deception to prevent Pakistan from detecting preparations. Routine activity continued along the front, while reconnaissance was carried out at night. The objective was to preserve the element of surprise until the commandos were in position.
THE NIGHT OF SEPTEMBER 28
The operation was launched in the early hours of September 29. The Indian Army’s Special Forces teams moved through difficult terrain, crossing obstacles that included forward defensive positions, minefields and trip flares. They had to travel deep enough into enemy territory to reach the selected targets without being detected.
From the operations room, Dua only received limited updates. Radio communication was deliberately restricted because of the possibility of interception. Small communication devices and pre-decided code words were used to indicate progress. UAVs monitored the movement of the teams.
Then came the first complication.
Firing began at one location before the planned launch time. It was unclear whether the Indian Army team had been detected or whether the firing had started for another reason. The decision was made to bring forward the assault by around 15 to 20 minutes.
And then, Dua wrote in his book, the strikes began.
At one of the terror camps, a petrol and diesel dump was hit, producing a massive explosion and heavy casualties. UAV footage captured the blast, although the resulting smoke temporarily obscured the camera’s view.
The attacks by the Indian forces were swift. Once their objectives were achieved, the commandos began withdrawing towards the LoC.
